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 Chapter 9 
 Sending Country Policies 
 Eva  Østergaard-Nielsen 
 Introduction 
 Migrant origin countries have come to play an increasingly important role in 
research on processes of migration, migrant belonging, and migrant settlement. 
Especially since the late 1990s, sending countries have moved from a somewhat 
marginal position to a more central place in migration studies. During this period, 
the fi eld of migration studies has seen a growth in single case research and compara-
tive analyses of sending country perceptions and policies towards their emigrants 
and diasporas. This trend accompanies an empirical development wherein more and 
more countries of origin seek to strengthen relations with their emigrant populations 
by facilitating emigrant return, providing overseas consular assistance, and inviting 
emigrant economic and political engagement from afar. Furthermore, the emergent 
transnational optic in migration studies has encouraged researchers to consider the 
interests and politics of the country of origin in analyses of migration fl ows, migrant 
settlement, and transnational practices. 
 Studies of sending countries highlight the growing power of sending states in the 
context of globalization and transnational migration. When reaching out to their 
emigrant populations, sending countries have tried to shape processes of migration 
and migrant transnational practices (Østergaard-Nielsen  2003a ; Levitt and De la 
Dehesa  2003 ; Chin and Smith  2014 ; Guarnizo  1998 ). Indeed, sending country out-
reach policies aimed at bonding with and facilitating long-distance engagement of 
diasporas have been depicted as a process of redefi ning the state and its borders 
(Levitt and De la Dehesa  2003 ; Mügge  2012a ; Chin and Smith  2014 ). Two issues 
are worth highlighting in this regard. First, this phenomenon is not entirely new, as 
noted by much of the literature. States have long catered to and invited the support 
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of their expatriate populations through consular services and strategically placed 
chambers of commerce. What is arguably different today is the scale and intensity 
of these outreach policies and initiatives (R. C. Smith  2003b ). Second, sending 
country policies towards emigrants may intersect with migration and migrant incor-
poration policies in countries of residence. This renders the interests and policy-
making of receiving states an important factor for understanding the potential and 
limits of sending country policies towards their emigrant populations. 
 Sending countries do not reach out to their emigrants in equal measure. The vari-
ance in outreach policies is interesting because any analysis of these issues needs to 
confront the transnational political agency of migrants and states within broader 
national and international political developments and structures. This chapter 
explores the twin central questions of how and why countries of origin reach out to 
their expatriate populations, focusing mainly on studies related to Europe. It fi rst 
outlines some basic concepts and typologies of sending country policies with a 
particular emphasis on some of the key countries of origin of migrants settled within 
the European Union (EU). It subsequently reviews some of the core explanations 
for the emergence of sending country policies. Finally, it discusses the impact of 
sending country policies on migrant settlement from the perspective of political 
authorities in countries of residence. 
 In so doing, this analysis addresses a research fi eld that spans all social science 
disciplines, and consequently a wide range of methodologies. Research on sending 
countries is still dominated by single case studies and comparisons focused within 
a particular region. European-based research has centred on the countries of origin 
of the larger migrant collectives from outside of the EU, such as Turkey (Østergaard- 
Nielsen  2009 ,  2003c ; Mügge  2012b ) and Morocco (De Haas  2007 ; Brand  2002 ), or 
on the Eastern European countries that recently became EU members (Waterbury 
 2006 ). Of course, there are also studies on Latin American sending country policies, 
such as those of Ecuador (Boccagni  2014 ; Maisonave  2011 ), Bolivia and Mexico 
(Lafl eur  2012 ), and Argentina and Uruguay (Margheritis  2014 ), as well as Asia 
(China) (Pieke et al.  2004 ). Recently, several studies have attempted a broad cross- 
regional comparison in order to evaluate some of the core assumptions often made 
regarding why sending states reach out to their populations (Ragazzi  2014 ; Gamlen 
et al.  2013 ; Gamlen  2008 ). 
 It should be noted that two of the central terms within this literature are not 
straightforward to use. First, the term ‘sending state’ or ‘sending country’ implies 
that these countries or states actively send or export their emigrants, which is often 
not the case. Alternative concepts include ‘emigration countries’, ‘emigration 
states’ (Gamlen  2008 ), and ‘emigration nations’ (Collyer  2014 ), but they appear 
less in the literature. Second, the frequently used term ‘diaspora engagement poli-
cies’ includes the word diaspora, the defi nition and signifi cance of which is the 
object of a long-standing debate. Despite these reservations, this chapter follows the 
general trend of using the terms ‘sending country’ or ‘sending state’. It refers to 
expatriate populations as both diasporas and emigrants. In any case, it is worth 
emphasizing that most countries are not either countries of origin or reception, but 
experience both types of fl ows. 
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 Mapping the Outreach Policies of Countries of Origin 
 The history of state-sponsored attention to emigrants and expatriates is as long as 
the history of consular services. The introductory note to the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations traces consular activities back to ancient Greece and the Italian 
city-state of Genoa, where specially appointed notables residing abroad looked out 
for merchants and citizens in their locality. 1 The growth in consular institutions fol-
lowed globalization and intensifi cation of foreign trade and migration. Especially 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, consulates added the tasks of protect-
ing and servicing citizens residing temporarily or permanently abroad to their work 
on promoting trade-relations. Today when we talk about sending country policies, 
the scope of institutions and policies involved is much more diverse. The following 
sections illustrate some of the broader categories of sending country policies as well 
as their complexity. 
 One set of outreach policies of sending countries falls within the  economic 
domain and aims primarily at attracting the economic resources of the emigrants. 
This type of policies has received attention not only from emigrant states but also 
from all major international organizations involved in migration policies. In particu-
lar, the topic of remittances has been central in the renewed policy debate on migra-
tion and development. Certainly, the sums involved are substantial and on the 
increase. In 2013, global remittance fl ows were estimated at US $542 billion. 2 
Remittances are a welcome source of foreign income for the local, regional, and 
national economy of the country of origin, but there is concern that those countries 
where remittances constitute a substantial part of gross domestic product (GDP) are 
vulnerable to fl uctuations in remittance infl ows. Consequently, there is no shortage 
of sending country policies aimed at encouraging and facilitating remittances. For 
instance, sending countries may facilitate special banking arrangements that make 
remittance transfers easy and more affordable. Some countries, such as India, have 
tried to attract foreign investment from diasporas by issuing special government 
bonds (Lall  2003 ). There are also examples of sending countries granting tax 
exemptions and fi scal advantages to non-resident citizen investors or to business 
ventures of return migrants, as is the case in Ecuador and Senegal. Another example 
is to allow return migrants to buy property otherwise off-limits to foreigners and to 
ease taxation of second residences in the country of origin, as in the case of India 
and the Philippines (Aguinas and Newland  2012 ). Other initiatives to encourage 
emigrant spending in the country of origin include the promotion of emigrant tour-
ism. Through special offers, Morocco encourages generous holiday spending among 
its up to one million citizens who return for holidays each summer (De Haas  2007 ). 
In the Philippines, advertisements in the mass media encourage migrant parents to 
purchase gifts for their family at home (Alcid  2003 ). 
1 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Vienna, 24 April 1963, Introductory note,  http://legal.
un.org/avl/ha/vccr/vccr.html , accessed 18/4 2014. 
2  World Bank, Migration and Remittances, April 2014, at  http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/exter-
nal/news/0,,contentmdk:20648762 ~ pagepk:64257043 ~ pipk:437376 ~ thesitepk:4607,00.html 
(accessed April 2014). 
9 Sending Country Policies
150
 Some policies aim more directly at creating or reinforcing synergies between 
migration and development. An often-cited example is the policy of attracting col-
lective remittances dedicated to development projects in migrants’ hometowns. 
Mexico is famous for its “three for one” programmes, in which the three levels of 
government (municipal, state, and federal) match the amount of money donated by 
hometown associations to development projects (Williams  2012 ). Sending coun-
tries may also seek to tap into diaspora business and scientifi c networks. These poli-
cies aim to reverse brain drain by encouraging emigrant scientists to return to their 
country of origin, as in the case of Italy, or to lead joint academic networks from 
afar, as in the case of Morocco (Aguinas and Newland  2012 ). 
 A second set of sending countries policies falls within the  political domain. These 
can be categorized as an extension of political rights to non-resident nationals or 
attempts to infl uence and control expat political activities abroad. In terms of the 
extension of political rights, sending country governments may facilitate emigrants’ 
retention and passing on of their citizenship by reforming rules of citizenship acqui-
sition and loss, including dual citizenship (Jones-Correa  2001 ). Another trend is for 
emigrant states to create an “emigrant citizenship” that gives more rights to non- 
resident citizens than to other foreigners. The overseas citizenship of India, the 
Pakistan Overseas Card, and the Turkish Pink Card (later replaced by the Blue Card) 
are examples of identity cards granting a particular set of rights. These arrangements 
do not usually include voting rights (Aguinas and Newland  2012 ; Mügge  2012b ). 
However, voting rights for non-resident citizens are on the increase. By 2007, no less 
than 115 states granted long-distance voting rights in homeland elections to non-
resident citizens (Ellis et al.  2007 ). These rights come in a variety of forms. The most 
inclusive allow all citizens to vote in all elections (legislative, local, and presiden-
tial), via personal, postal, or Internet voting procedures and with no prior registration 
required before each election (Lafl eur  2012 ; Collyer  2014 ; Bauböck  2007 ). A major 
distinction is between those electoral systems where emigrants can elect their own 
representatives and are accordingly divided into external districts and those electoral 
systems where the emigrant vote is counted in an electoral district in the homeland. 
Only 13 countries currently allow their non-resident citizens to elect their own can-
didates. Of these, fi ve are EU member states (Croatia, Romania, Portugal, Italy, and 
France) and eight are not (Algeria, Cape Verde, Columbia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Macedonia, Mozambique, and Tunisia) (Collyer  2014 ). 
 Political rights can also take the form of councils established for dialogue with 
emigrants. A number of emigration countries with signifi cant populations of citi-
zens residing within the EU have such councils. For instance, Turkey set up an 
advisory board from 1997 to 2000 that included 45 Turkish citizens residing abroad 
as well as representatives of political parties and the state minister responsible for 
Turks abroad (Østergaard-Nielsen  2003c ). Morocco established its Council for the 
Moroccan Community Abroad in 2007, with Moroccan emigrants being appointed 
by the Palace (De Haas  2007 ; Østergaard-Nielsen  2012 ). Yet, these councils cannot 
be considered a univocal success in terms of allowing emigrants a voice in diaspora 
engagement policies. The representativeness of the councils was criticized by 
migrant associations in both cases (Østergaard-Nielsen  2012 ,  2003b ). 
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 In terms of sending country policies aimed at infl uencing and controlling emi-
grant political activities abroad, studies have revealed that sending countries may 
seek to convey a particular political agenda and to build an emigrant lobby in their 
favour. This may be done through consulates or by funding cultural institutions or 
emigrant associations, or simply by communications via various types of media. 
This strategy is especially pertinent when a sizeable and visible emigrant group 
resides in a country that is important to the country of origin, as is the case of 
Mexicans in the USA and Turkish citizens in Germany. For instance, the Turkish 
state actively sought to mobilize Turkish citizens in protest against the recognition 
of the Armenian Genocide and in favour of Turkey’s EU membership (Østergaard- 
Nielsen  2009 ). This strategy of “courting the diaspora” is a departure from the more 
defensive tactic of policing the diaspora and trying to curb dissidence abroad 
through withdrawal of citizenship or the consular control of migrant associations 
(Østergaard-Nielsen  2003a ; De Haas  2007 ). 
 A third set of policies falls within the  domain of welfare and social rights . 
Sending country governments may respond to emigrant calls for assistance by 
extending welfare provisions to non-resident citizens. For instance, Spain extends 
pensions to Spanish citizens abroad, and some regional governments allow emi-
grants access to health services when home on holidays (Østergaard-Nielsen and 
Ciornei  2013 ). Some of the sending countries with the largest numbers of nationals 
residing within the EU have negotiated bilateral social security agreements covering 
their citizens abroad. As such, Turkey and Morocco have secured full portability of 
benefi ts for, respectively, 68 % and 89 % of their workers abroad (Avato et al.  2010 ). 
Social security cooperation between countries of residence has also taken place 
within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Indeed, recent research has 
counted 594 bilateral or multilateral social security agreements between EU mem-
ber states and countries outside of the EU (ibid.). 
 A related area is the  cultural and religious domain , in which sending countries 
sponsor and facilitate a range of services to emigrants and their descendants. Some 
states offer educational programmes for emigrant descendants. This might be in the 
form of partial or complete funding for schools abroad. Both Italy and France have 
extensive networks of public schools in cities with larger concentrations of emi-
grants. In other cases, sending country governments may sponsor after-school 
classes. The Turkish government and ministry of education, for example, organize 
classes in Turkish language, history, and culture for emigrant descendants 
(Østergaard-Nielsen  2003c ). 
 Sending countries may also facilitate religious services for their citizens abroad. 
This is especially relevant for emigrants residing in countries where their religion is 
a minority. In these situations, sending countries have sponsored the presence of 
religious leaders and places of worship. For instance, in the wake of labour emigra-
tion, the Turkish Ministry for Religious Affairs supported establishment of religious 
associations in places with large concentrations of Turkish emigrants. These 
 organizations have Turkish government-funded imams, a physical space for reli-
gious practices, and infrastructure for potentially complicated issues, such as funer-
als in the country of origin (Østergaard-Nielsen  2003c ). Morocco, too, facilitates 
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religious services for its citizens abroad. For instance, 176 imams were dispatched 
to Europe during Ramadan in 2008 (Østergaard-Nielsen  2012 ). 
 Since sending country outreach policies may span different policy aims and min-
istries, some sending countries have undertaken signifi cant ministerial or consular 
reforms (Table  9.1 ). This entails creation of special ministries or departments for 
emigrants to strengthen the overall coordination of emigrant policies. A recent 
report identifi ed 22 ministries and 17 subministry-level offi ces for diasporas in a 
sample of 77 sending countries (Aguinas and Newland  2012 ). In the case of Ecuador, 
the establishment of the National Secretary for the Migrant (SENAMI), originally 
with an emigrant returning from the USA at the helm, is a case in point. SENAMI 
was set up to identify needs for Ecuadorian intervention, to promote emigrant liveli-
hoods within the “Fifth Region”, thus sending a strong message of government 
support to nationals overseas (Boccagni  2011 ). Indeed, the creation of such national- 
 Table 9.1  Examples of sending country policies 
 Category  Dimensions 
 Economic domain  Facilitating transfer of remittances through discounts on bank 
transfers 
 Investment policies, e.g., special government bonds for diaspora 
investors 
 Tax exemptions and fi scal advantages to attract expat investment 
 National, regional, and local government programmes to match 
funding provided by emigrants for development-oriented projects 
in their hometowns 
 Property rights allowing emigrants and expatriates to buy land 
that is otherwise not available to non-residents. Easing 
of taxation on property for non-resident citizens 
 Encouraging business and scientifi c networks 
 Political domain: 
Extending political rights 
 Dual citizenship policies 
 External voting rights 
 Setting up platforms for consultative dialogue, such as councils 
of emigrants 
 Political domain: 
Infl uencing political 
activities abroad 
 Encouraging lobbying for country of origin interests in country 
of residence 
 Social domain  Welfare provisions, extending social security (pension, access to 
healthcare during holidays) to emigrants 
 Bilateral agreements on social rights with countries of residence 
 Religious and cultural 
domain 
 Sponsoring religious institutions or personnel abroad 
 Funding cultural centres abroad 
 Government-sponsored schools abroad 
 Broadcasting of national media abroad 
 Other policies of 
recognition 
 Including diaspora in national calendar of celebrations 
 Diaspora conferences 
 Honouring expats with awards 
 Source: Based on especially Østergaard-Nielsen  2003a ; Ragazzi  2014 ; Levitt and De la Dehesa 
 2003 ; Gamlen  2008 ; Aguinas and Newland  2012 
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level institutions has been interpreted as sending a message to emigrants that their 
plight is being taken seriously (Levitt and De la Dehesa  2003 ).
 Other initiatives aim more directly at strengthening real and symbolic ties with 
emigrants and diasporas. “Diaspora conferences”, have been organized by Armenia, 
Cyprus, and Turkey to create and strengthen networks and loyalty among emigrant 
notables (Østergaard-Nielsen  2003a ). Some countries hold festivals, such as the 
Gathering in Ireland (Collyer  2013 ), have an institutionalized “day of the diaspora”, 
or honour emigrants with awards (Gamlen  2008 ; Ragazzi  2014 ). 
 It is worth highlighting that these policies refer only to state-sponsored initia-
tives, leaving aside the outreach and mobilization of other actors from the country 
of origin, such as political parties, religious organizations, and charity or develop-
ment foundations. Moreover, the focus on government policies bypasses the impor-
tant aspect of government rhetoric towards emigrants. Several studies note that 
policy measures are often preceded or accompanied by a shift towards a more cel-
ebratory discourse regarding emigrants (Østergaard-Nielsen  2003a ; Levitt and De 
la Dehesa  2003 ; Collyer  2013 ; Smith  2008 ). The long and complex list of sending 
country policies includes not only policies that encourage emigrants to support their 
country of origin but also some policies aimed at improving migrants’ livelihoods 
in their countries of residence, such as by extending social rights. Moreover, send-
ing country government leaders may call for stronger protection of their workers 
abroad in terms of labour market conditions and anti-discrimination policies. For 
instance, during the Ecuadorian electoral campaign in 2006, presidential candidate 
Rafael Correa lamented that emigrants were ‘the biggest victims of the long neolib-
eral night, but also the biggest heroes’ and promised that ‘never again will the pro-
tagonists of the big national disaster called emigration be abandoned’. Consequently 
his electoral programme included a range of social assistance measures and 
 protection of workers abroad. 3 However, many of these topics fell outside the bilat-
eral agreements between Ecuador and the countries of residence of Ecuadorian emi-
grants. Rather, this level of protection of workers abroad falls within the receiving 
country’s political jurisdiction. In such cases, the sending country’s scope of action 
is limited and subject to approval of and agreement with the receiving state. 
 Explaining Sending Country Policies: Transnational Interests, 
National Politics, and the International Diffusion of Ideas 
 The twin questions of what motivates emigrant countries to formulate and imple-
ment outreach policies and why sending country policies tend to differ or converge 
have been approached in a number of ways. Again, it is worth noting that most of 
3  ht tp: / /ecuadorinmediato.com/index.php?module = Noticias&func = news_user_
view&id = 39940&umt = rafael_correa_lanza_propuesta_para_emigrantes_ecuatorianos and 
 http://elpais.com/diario/2007/10/21/espana/1192917613_850215.html (accessed April 2014, 
translation of author). 
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this literature is based on single case or country studies. These studies provide a 
good contextualized understanding of the perceptions and processes leading to out-
reach policies, but they fail to test hypotheses systematically across a larger number 
of cases. Moreover, the fi rst wave of studies of migrant transnationalism exhibited a 
tendency to sample on the dependent variable (Portes  2001 ). This extends to the 
analysis of sending country policies as well, since few studies have included emi-
gration countries with little or no political or administrative attention to emigrants 
(Mügge  2012a ). Finally, studies do not necessarily operate with the same dependent 
variable. Comparative analyses of sending country policies have tended to focus on 
only one set of outreach policies, such as political rights, without positioning them 
within the wider context of policies towards emigrants (Ragazzi  2014 ). Yet, differ-
ent sets of policies may derive from different motivations, rendering the fi ndings 
from one policy fi eld less applicable to another. 
 A fi rst step towards understanding sending country policies is to elaborate a 
typology of sending countries based on the scope and intensity of a broad range of 
outreach policies. A basic categorization is between states that do reach out to emi-
grants, such as Italy, and those that do not, such as Denmark. In addition to this 
distinction between engaged and disengaged states, there is a category of “strategi-
cally selective states”, which encourage emigrants to stay in touch but extend to 
them only a subset of rights and services (Levitt and Glick Schiller  2004 ). Some 
studies have based their classifi cation on the motives underlying policies. For 
instance, Gamlen ( 2008 ) builds a classifi cation on the distinction between diaspora 
creating and diaspora integrating policy mechanisms, concluding that those states 
that employ one set of policies but not the other are emigration states “on paper” or 
in an incoherent way (ibid.). In a somewhat similar vein, studies of sending coun-
tries have employed notions of governance, or the Foucauldian notion of “govern-
mentality”, as the dependent variable, identifying types and forms of extraterritorial 
sending country policies aimed at creating, mobilizing, or controlling emigrant 
populations from afar (Délano and Gamlen  2014 ; Gamlen  2008 ; Maisonave  2011 ). 
 Recent analyses base their classifi cation of sending country policies on the dif-
ferent confi gurations of policies. This results in a classifi cation that distinguishes 
not only between the disinterested and engaged states, but also between the expatri-
ate state (which directs cultural and educational policies at high-income expats who 
reside temporarily abroad) and the managed labour state (which maintains policies 
to attract remittances and extend welfare provisions to lower income emigrant 
workers) (Ragazzi  2014 ). The distinction between policies directed at migrants per-
ceived as temporarily abroad and those considered permanent expatriates is impor-
tant and echoes the classifi cation of R. C. Smith ( 2003b ) between emigrant policies 
and global nation policies. There is a key difference between those countries that 
primarily want to facilitate labour export and those that aim mainly to keep in touch 
with overseas nationals and their descendants. Both sets of countries may be inter-
ested in keeping remittances fl owing, but the existence of a broader set of “bonding” 
policies is more likely among the latter. 
 When it comes to explaining why states reach out to their emigrant populations, 
the literature points to a broad range of historical and (geo) political variables that 
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account for differences in emigrant state policies. Recent studies group the 
 explanations according to research area, such as migration and development, trans-
nationalism, and citizenship or governance (Collyer  2013 ; Délano and Gamlen 
 2014 ). Others focus on overall conceptual approach, distinguishing between interest 
maximization, national ideologies, traditions of governance, and policy diffusion 
(Ragazzi  2014 ; Gamlen et al.  2013 ; Délano  2013 ). The sections below build on 
these distinctions, though the main variables and hypotheses are grouped in a 
slightly different way according to the weight and signifi cance placed on transna-
tional and domestic actors, interests, and types of processes. The fi rst section dis-
cusses the understanding of sending country policies as an outcome of the different 
confi gurations of interests and power in transnational state–emigrant relations. The 
second section focuses on an analysis of sending country policies as a result of 
political processes within the countries of origin, such as broader democratization, 
national identity, and partisan policy interests. Finally, the last sections discuss the 
conceptualizations of sending country policies as being shaped by processes of 
policy diffusion at the global, regional, or even bilateral level. These approaches 
emphasize different sending country policies. Yet, all of them seek to link a specifi c 
set of actors, interests, or processes with the broader scope and level of sending 
country outreach policies. 
 Transnational Relations as an Outcome of the Balance 
of Interests and Power between Sending Countries 
and Diasporas 
 A dominant trend in research has been to view sending state policies as an outcome 
of the balance of interests and power between sending countries and diasporas. 
From this perspective, sending states reach out to their diasporas in recognition of 
the economic and political contributions that emigrants might make via remittances, 
foreign direct investment, or political support (Sheffer  1986 ; Bauböck  2003 ; 
Østergaard-Nielsen  2003a ; Guarnizo  1998 ). Consequently, sending country out-
reach policies constitute a particularly attractive strategy for states that occupy a 
marginal position in the global economic and political system (Guarnizo  1998 ). For 
these countries, diaspora engagement policies are, so to speak, a foot in the door to 
the economic benefi ts of globalization. Other analyses emphasize the political sig-
nifi cance of diasporas, in particular, when a sizeable proportion of the sending 
country’s population resides in a receiving country or region important for its for-
eign policy or when a dissident voice is unwanted by the homeland. 
 Thus, one overall hypothesis of why countries reach out to their diasporas is 
based on a rational cost-benefi t analysis by the political elite of the sending country; 
that is, the more important the diaspora is for the economy and domestic and foreign 
policy of the country of origin, the more likely that country is to seek to “tap into” 
diaspora resources through outreach policies. This might be with policies aimed 
directly at maximizing remittance fl ows or via broader policy reforms to encourage 
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the continued loyalty of the diaspora. Indeed, the role of remittances is given 
 signifi cant weight in this strand of analysis as outreach policies are seen as ‘part of 
a broader effort to attract or channel migrant remittances’ (Levitt and De la Dehesa 
 2003 , 595). Similarly, Waterbury ( 2006 ) argues that some emigrant states reach out 
to their diasporas residing in countries with assimilatory migrant incorporation 
regimes in order to retain loyalty and keep remittances fl owing. 
 The notion of diaspora engagement policies as the outcome of a cost-benefi t 
analysis related to the economic and political strength of sending countries’ over-
seas nationals is straightforward but ultimately fails to offer a comprehensive ana-
lytical framework. First, it does not explain why some of the countries most 
dependent on migrant remittances have not implemented the most comprehensive 
sending country policies. Arguably, the answer could be that those countries that 
already receive a large and steady fl ow of remittances need not do anything further 
to attract such funds, except keep facilitating labour export. Second, it does not 
explain why a variety of countries that are not dependent on emigrant economic and 
political support have reached out to their emigrants, as have Spain, Italy, and 
France. 
 Moreover, emigrants and diasporas are not passive entities merely waiting for 
their country of origin to approach them. Another notion is that of sending country 
outreach policies being a response to demand from an organized and powerful dias-
pora (Østergaard-Nielsen  2003a ). Such demands from a diaspora may be backed by 
the expatriates’ economic and political strength. The role of the Armenian diaspora 
in the fi rst set of Armenian outreach policies after independence is a case in point 
(Panossian  2003 ). However, this perspective does not view outreach policies as 
stemming from a dictate from the diaspora. Instead it highlights the domestic poli-
tics of the country of origin, as diaspora demands and potential support enter power 
struggles among main political actors in the country of origin. 
 The Politics of the State and Nation 
 Most analysis has drawn on the domestic political situation in the country of origin 
to explain why sending countries reach out to their emigrants. One argument is that 
the degree of democratization and political competition in the homeland determine 
the extent to which this competition spills over into the transnational realm. To 
illustrate, during processes of democratization and increased political competition, 
political parties may vie for the diaspora’s support. For instance, political parties 
believing themselves to have support among emigrants might push for the extension 
of dual citizenship and political rights, as happened in Mexico and the Dominican 
Republic (M. P. Smith  2003a ; Itzigsohn  2014 ; Rhodes and Harutyunyan  2010 ). This 
argument is complicated by the fact that some emigrant states, albeit democratic, 
tend to largely ignore their emigrants; and emigrant states that are not democracies, 
or at least not experiencing a linear process of democratization or political liberal-
ization, have been known to reach out to their emigrant populations. In the case of 
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the latter, the desire for extra-territorial control of citizens and civil society has been 
identifi ed as a core incentive (R. C. Smith  2003b ; Østergaard-Nielsen  2012 ). 
Outreach policies under Mussolini’s fascist regime were considered part of an over-
all strategy to keep dissident mobilization in check (R. C. Smith  2003b ; Lafl eur 
 2012 ). With these policies, Italy extended a range of political rights (including state- 
sponsored return tickets to vote in homeland elections) and social and cultural rights 
(e.g., Italian schools abroad and the organization of emigrant associations). 
 A second line of argument suggests that sending state outreach policies are 
shaped by forms of nationhood and processes of nation-building in the country of 
origin (Boccagni  2014 ). This view is especially related to the extension of citizen-
ship to overseas nationals. One hypothesis in this regard is that an understanding of 
the nation based on ethnic rather than territorial criteria would render emigration 
states more likely to reach out to and include their nationals abroad in what has been 
termed a process of re-ethnicization of citizenship (Joppke  2003 ). Such a path- 
dependent approach to understanding policy outcomes as dependent on types of 
civic or ethnic national models of citizenship has, however, been criticized as unable 
to explain why states shift their policies towards emigrants (and immigrants). As 
argued by Bauböck ( 2013 , xv), we should see understandings of nationhood not as 
independent variables but as ‘discourses through which states legitimate their poli-
cies that may be driven by quite different motives’. Indeed, a more constructivist 
approach to the complex relationship between homeland narratives of the nation 
and those of emigrants has been highlighted in recent work on sending country poli-
cies (Collyer  2013 ; Boccagni  2014 ). It could be added that this type of research 
requires an analysis that distinguishes which set of political actors in the sending 
countries frames their support or opposition to outreach policies towards emigrants. 
For instance, Joppke ( 2003 ) in an analysis of three EU member states—Spain, 
France, and Italy—demonstrates that centre right to extreme right wing parties have 
pushed for a more inclusive approach to emigrant citizenship while maintaining a 
restrictive line towards immigrant naturalization criteria. 
 A further perspective pertaining to the political characteristics of the country of 
origin emphasizes the type of political and economic governance (Ragazzi  2014 ; 
Gamlen  2008 ; Gamlen et al.  2013 ). According to Ragazzi ( 2014 ), there is a relation-
ship between the political-economic model of a state and the development of state 
policies. The more closed an economy is (in foreign trade and control of the fi nan-
cial system) the more closed its attitude towards emigrants will be. More open (neo-
liberal) states, will be more inclusive. In an analysis of 35 countries, Ragazzi (ibid.) 
concludes that this best explains the development of diaspora policies. 
 A look at the politics underlying policies in countries of origin emphasizes that 
these policies are also the product of domestic political power confi gurations, 
including not only political parties but also interest organizations and emigrants in 
their powerbase. Comparative studies examining the roles of these actors could fur-
ther clarify how emigrant policies relate back not just to the broader characteristics 
of the political system but also to negotiation and contestation between the main 
political actors in the country of origin. 
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 Global Norms and the International Diffusion of Ideas 
 Another set of explanations of why sending countries reach out to their citizens 
abroad positions emigrant and diaspora policies within processes of idea and norm 
diffusion through international organizations (Levitt and De la Dehesa  2003 ; Rhodes 
and Harutyunyan  2010 ), regional networks of states (Délano  2013 ), and even bilat-
eral exchanges of information (Iskander  2010 ). Norms are here understood as col-
lective understandings of appropriate behaviour (Guiraudon  2012 ). The basic idea 
is that there is an evolution of norms of how sending country policies can optimize 
the externalities of international migration. Formulation and implementation of 
sending country policies take cues from this process of norm evolution. For instance, 
the emergence of new international norms of nationhood and citizen protection has 
been argued to infl uence emigrant state policies within the domain of citizenship 
and political rights. States liberalize their citizenship policies in step with globaliza-
tion and adhere to more post-national or cosmopolitan notions of nationhood. Such 
a deterritorialization of citizenship, coupled with a stronger commitment to human 
rights norms, may arguably translate into more inclusive policies towards both 
immigrants and emigrants (Joppke  2008 ; Rhodes and Harutyunyan  2010 ; Soysal 
 1994 ; Levitt and De la Dehesa  2003 ). 
 A broader set of outreach policies can be understood in the context of evolving 
norms of global migration governance. Here, the role of emigrant countries in 
recovering lost resources, especially in the policy fi elds of migration and develop-
ment, is lauded as a “best practice”, because it allows not just the migrant receiving 
states but also emigrant states to partake in bilateral or multilateral cooperation on 
migration issues (Gamlen et al.  2013 ). This view is refl ected in the agenda and rec-
ommendations of the Global Forum on Migration and Development and the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) sponsored  Handbook on Diaspora 
Engagement , which provides ‘a user-friendly accessible and practical guide on the 
state of the art in governmental diaspora initiatives…designed to help policy makers 
and practitioners fi t the many elements of diaspora policy into a coherent strategy’ 
(Aguinas and Newland  2012 , 14). Indeed, there are strong indications that sending 
states which move in the same international circles are picking up on this advice. 
From 2000 to 2008, 20 % of all poverty reduction strategies published by develop-
ing states included a call for engaging expatriate communities (Gamlen et al.  2013 ). 
 In terms of the regional and national politics of policy diffusion, Délano ( 2013 ) 
identifi es a convergence of practices and policies of emigrant states in Latin America 
as a result of dialogue and information sharing among Latin American govern-
ments. Three factors are identifi ed as crucial to this process: the infl uence of the 
Mexican example, the ideological convergence of Latin American governments, 
and fi nally the fact that these countries largely share the same emigrant destination 
country, the USA (ibid.). Iskander ( 2010 ) traces policy diffusion across regions, 
demonstrating that Morocco and Mexico learned from each other (and the emi-
grants) through a creative process of policy innovation. The overall suggestion is 
that domestic resistance to outreach policies among segments or all of the homeland 
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political elite can be overcome with a consolidating example from another sending 
country that has successfully implemented such policies (Délano  2013 ). 
 The perspective on norms and policy diffusion adds an interesting dimension to 
our understanding of the complex interplay between processes within and beyond 
the nation state. It highlights the fact that ideas travel and that international, regional, 
and bilateral relationships matter (Délano  2013 ). Moreover, it calls for further anal-
yses of what domestic factors matter for the incorporation of international or region-
ally evolving norms of state-emigrant policies (Guiraudon  2012 ). 
 All in all, these different approaches place different emphases on different actors 
and processes. Few would argue that emigration policies can be understood only 
with reference to either the strength and potential of the emigrants, the political situ-
ation in the country of origin, or the diffusion of policy norms. Instead qualitative 
studies have tended to look at the particular confi guration of several or all of these 
factors across a limited number of cases, and broader systematic statistical studies 
have increasingly tested these different predictors in a particular policy area or a 
broader set of policies. The study of relations between the sending country and its 
emigrants has been criticized as being largely a-theoretical (Délano and Gamlen 
 2014 ). Yet, overall the fi eld appears to have increasingly taken up the challenge of 
developing theory on the roles of actors, norms, and processes at the national, trans-
national, and international level. 
 Perceptions of Sending Country Policies in Countries 
of Residence 
 An important aspect of sending country policies aimed at reaching out to nationals 
abroad is their impact on both the emigrants and the political authorities of the 
country of residence. Indeed, the role of sending countries in the integration of their 
citizens abroad is central to the European Commission’s “three way approach to 
integration of third country nationals” (EC  2011 , see Garcés-Mascareñas and 
Penninx in this volume). The actual impact of sending country policies on the scope 
and direction of migrant transnationality is still an evolving research fi eld. There is 
a growing body of literature on the nexus between migrant transnationality and 
integration (see Mügge in this volume). Yet, there is still work to do regarding the 
impact of sending country policies on both migrant transnationality and migrant 
processes of settlement. Regarding migrant transnationality, it can be diffi cult to 
determine to what extent emigrant state efforts to bond with their non-resident citi-
zens are directly responsible for migrant transnational practices related to their 
country of origin. These practices are embedded in broader political and economic 
processes as well. For instance, a recent report on remittances to Latin American 
emigrant countries explains changes in remittance fl ows by labour market condi-
tions in the country of residence and by changing macroeconomic conditions in the 
sending country, but without mentioning sending country policies aimed at 
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increasing these fl ows (Guiraudon  2012 ). Moreover, several cases suggest that emi-
grants respond only reluctantly to outreach policies of the homeland. Turnout in 
homeland elections is a notorious case in point, as it is usually nowhere near domes-
tic electoral participatory rates, because the cost of voting in terms of both access to 
information and the logistics of voter registration is rather high (Lafl eur  2012 ). 
Emigrants may in general be sceptical towards the outreach of a homeland regime, 
since lack of trust in that very regime may have been an incentive for emigration in 
the fi rst place (Østergaard-Nielsen  2003a ; Boccagni  2014 ). Indeed, a recent hand-
book on bonding with the diaspora repeatedly emphasizes the importance of foster-
ing trust in the country of origin among emigrants and diasporas—an indication that 
diasporas are not necessarily confi dent in the political institutions of their homeland 
(Aguinas and Newland  2012 ). 
 Sending country policies may, more or less explicitly, try to link with processes 
of migrant settlement. Overall, the strengthening of upward social mobility of emi-
grants in their country of residence is usually interpreted as a win-win scenario for 
sending countries and emigrants, as wanting the best for your citizens abroad is not 
incompatible with having a fi nancially and politically signifi cant expatriate lobby 
abroad (Bauböck  2003 ; Østergaard-Nielsen  2003a ; R. C. Smith  2003b ; Kirişci 
 2008 ). Still, emigrant state policies that aim to attract the attention and resources of 
emigrants have been viewed with ambiguity by governments of countries of resi-
dence, particularly those with a more assimilatory migrant integration regime 
(Østergaard-Nielsen  2009 ). Again there is little systematic research on how emi-
grant state policies are perceived in the receiving countries. 
 Within Europe, the idea of the sending country having a role to play in the inte-
gration of third country nationals, present in policy documents at the European 
level, is somewhat ambiguous at the national level. Research indicates that there are, 
very generally speaking, two quite opposite perceptions of the challenges posed and 
opportunities offered by emigrant state outreach policies (Østergaard-Nielsen 
 2009 ). There is the perception that outreach policies pose a challenge to migrant 
integration within the so-called “zero-sum” understanding of migrant loyalty; that 
is, the more focused migrants are on their country of origin, the less they will iden-
tify with and support their country of residence. This perspective considers sending 
country policies aimed explicitly at bonding with and tapping into the resources of 
a migrant collective as counterproductive to policies of migrant incorporation in the 
country of residence. More in tune with the policy vision of the European 
Commission is recognition of the potential of emigrant state policies aiming to tap 
the development potential of collaboration with emigrants and their associations. 
The understanding here is that migrants, either through return or from afar, can be 
important actors in local and national development dynamics in their countries of 
origin. 
 In terms of the perceptions of how sending country outreach policies intersect 
with migrant integration, some examples of sending country rhetoric related to 
“don’t forget me” attitudes have been unpalatable to countries of residence. For 
instance, during the 1980s, Turkish offi cials criticized German lack of dual citizen-
ship often in very strong terms, and consular staff berated Turkish emigrants for 
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trading their Turkish passport for a German one (Østergaard-Nielsen  2003c ; 
Özdemir  1997 ). In a later development, Turkey provides an illustrative case of a 
country of origin seeking to balance the desire to retain emigrant interest and loyalty 
in their country of origin while encouraging them to integrate in their country of 
residence. During the 2014 presidential electoral campaign, in which Turkish emi-
grants could vote for the fi rst time, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan encouraged 
them to learn the language of their country of residence and ‘not live like foreigners’ 
but also to preserve their mother tongue and cultural links to the homeland. 4 This 
message of “integration, but not assimilation” was, however, received with some 
caution among German and Austrian political leaders wary of the impact of country 
of origin leaders’ patriotic calls for loyalty. 5 
 In terms of the policy fi eld of migration and development, emigrant state policies 
of bonding with their citizens abroad is considered “best practice” (Aguinas and 
Newland  2012 ), and a growing number of policy initiatives have sought to strengthen 
partnerships with sending countries in order to tap into migrant transnationality. An 
example is the German aid agency, GIZ, which, among other things, has worked 
with Serbian migrant associations in Germany to build stronger trust in the Serbian 
fi nancial sector, in order to strengthen fl ows of remittances and foreign direct invest-
ment (ibid.). The question is to what extent such instances of international coopera-
tion among sending and receiving countries, which focus on how public policy can 
assist migrants in supporting their homeland, are matched by cooperation aimed at 
strengthening the integration of migrants in their receiving countries. 
 One important dimension in this respect is the protection of emigrant labourers 
in precarious work situations. As mentioned, sending countries have called for pro-
tection of their workers abroad. Ecuador’s government strongly criticized the 
Spanish and Italian governments for this reason (Boccagni  2014 ). The Philippines, 
too, has called for the protection of and proper salaries for especially domestic 
workers in the Gulf and Asia, and has secured a minimum wage for Philippine 
domestic workers in Malaysia (Ezquerra and Garcés-Mascareñas  2008 ). However, 
in most cases sending country governments lack the power to follow up these calls 
with any substantive policy measures. In this regard, sending country policies 
appear to be limited by the sovereign right of receiving states to defi ne labour mar-
ket conditions within their own borders (subject to international conventions) rein-
forced by the often very asymmetric power relations between sending and receiving 
countries. 
4  Turkish PM Erdoğan slams German media, calls for ‘integration’ but ‘no assimilation’ in Cologne, 
in Hurriyet Daily news, May 24 2014,  http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-
slams-german-media-calls-for-integration-but-no-assimilation-in-cologne.aspx?PageID = 238&N
ID = 66901&NewsCatID = 510 (accessed July 2014). 
5  http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/19/us-austria-turkey-idUSKBN0EU1ZI20140619 
(accessed July 2014) 
9 Sending Country Policies
162
 Concluding Remarks 
 Sending countries have taken an important leap from eking out a largely marginal 
existence to being recognized as a signifi cant player in European-based (transna-
tional) migration research. The overall fi eld of sending country policies includes a 
complex and fairly comprehensive range of initiatives aimed at assisting and attract-
ing support from emigrants and diasporas. These policies are recognized as interest-
ing in and of themselves because they challenge the basic idea of congruence 
between political communities and state borders. An increasingly methodologically 
sophisticated analysis of especially single case studies and focused comparisons 
and recently also comparative statistical analyses have highlighted a series of core 
explanatory frameworks for understanding the motivations of sending countries for 
reaching out to their emigrants. 
 Understanding the scope and rationale of sending country policies towards emi-
grants is an important and ongoing research fi eld. There is still a challenging 
research agenda ahead in terms of the transnational, national, and international poli-
tics of sending country policies. The policy fi eld of migration and development 
stimulates partnership and collaboration among countries of residence and origin 
(and the migrants themselves). Yet, more studies are needed to understand the over-
all dynamics of how sending country outreach policies designed to keep or rekindle 
a relationship with nationals abroad impact processes of settlement and how they 
square with receiving country interests. In that respect, it is worth bearing in mind 
that emigrants and diasporas may not immediately respond to sending countries’ 
outreach, because they are wary of the motives and credibility of these efforts and 
the extent to which they are sensitive to emigrant needs. Moreover, we still need to 
explore the extent to which European governments are moving away from the zero- 
sum debate and the securitization optic on migrant transnationality to a more inte-
grated three-way approach as envisioned by the European Commission. Such a shift 
may enable us to better understand the extent that sending country outreach policies 
aimed at both bonding with and supporting citizens abroad challenge territorial 
policy sovereignty and the strength of receiving countries in agenda-setting in inter-
national cooperation on migration and migrant settlement.
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